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Snmmarv After investigating the bargaining theories of Zeuthen, Nash, and Kalai and 
Smorodinsky, an alternative bargaining model is developed. The model is based on the 
maximum allowable conflict length. The bargaining outcome depends partij on time 
preferences. The model is therefore especialfy appropriate for description of bargaining 
between porties with unequal time preferences, e.g. bargaining between developed and 
developing countries. When time preferences are equal and the undiscounted Utilities are 
constant over time the solution of the proposed model is equal to the Nash-Zeuthen 
solution. 
Introduction 
The economist can not teil the outcome of two person bargaining, and that, he knows. 
The economist can determine the contract zone: the range of possible bargains, at 
which both parties do individually at least as good with the settlement as without. The 
contract zone consists generally of more than one point, and that is where the 
economist gets stuck: without additional assumptions, he can not piek a point. 
Johansen [1979] quite nicely sums up why: 
"Each party knows that if he can put forward a claim which leaves a positive 
gain, however small, for the other party, and if he can make the other party 
believe that his claim is final, not to be further modified, then the other party 
will acquiesce, taking out the positive gain rather than letting the bargaining 
come to a break down, which leaves no gain at all." (Johansen [1979], p. 514.) 
So the economist can not teil the bargaining outcome. But what he can do is make an 
educated guess. 
Several solutions to the bargaining problem have been proposed. These 
bargaining models belong to one of three different classes of models: Descriptive 
models (Zeuthen [1930], Hicks [1932], Ashenfelter and Johnson [1969], and others) 
cooperative games, combined with some axiomatic approach (Nash [1950], [1953], 
Kalai and Smorodinsky [1975]) and non-cooperative games (See Siebe [1991] for an 
overview). 
The individualistic non-cooperative game approach we will not use. The 
essential of bargaining is. trying to achieve an agreement jointly. An approach which 
takes joint strategy and enforcability of contracts as its topic is therefore a logical 
starting point, rather than one based on individualistic rationality and unenforca-
l 
bility.1 This is especially true as both bargainers are aware of the value of cooper-
ation. From psychological literature this appears to be the case: 
"A number of studies suggest that ECFI (Expected Cooperative Future 
Interaction) encourages a desire to build a relationship with the other party 
and hence a policy of cooperating with the other whenever possible and 
avoiding the appearance of exploiting the other. (Ben Yoav and Pruitt [1984], 
p.325)" 
On the other two approaches we base our own model. The crucial point is that both 
parties should coordinate their actions, and should (informally) agree to a set of rules 
according to which to proceed in bargaining. A possible interpretation of a negotiation 
model is that it represents the set of rules both parties have agreed to abide to. 
Desiderata of these set of rules are among others a plausible invention/ detection 
method for these set of rules2, fairness, and a solution dependent on bargaining 
power. 
The methodology used is to analyze some of the models mentioned above to build up 
a list of desirable characteristics of a set of rules. From that, we develop our own 
model, which we continue to explore in later sections. 
I. The strategical models of Zeutfaen's and Nash's with complete infnrmation 
Zeuthen 
In Zeuthen's model the crucial parameter to determine the bargaining strength of a 
party is the maximum allowable conflict risk (MACR). MACR depends on the conflict 
payoff and the demands of both parties, and is the chance of a conflict which makes 
one indifferent about staying put and giving in. As long as no agreement nas been 
reached (but proposals already have been made by both sides), each party calculates 
it's own MACR and compares it with the other party's MACR. As long as A's MACR 
is lower than the B's MACR, A is willing to compromise, and decrease its own 
demands. The same holds for B. 
It is assumed that each proposal can be characterized by p.3 The MACR is calculated 
from the payoff of one's own proposal, the payoff of the other party's proposal and 
1
 This, of course, does not mean that the non-cooperative approach is whithout its value. 
However, this study is part of a research program into negotiable agreements, so that explicit 
exchange of information is a possibility. The non-cooperative approach is more useful in those 
cases that explicit cooperation is not possible or allowed, e.g. in oligopoly with anti-cartel laws. 
2
 Specificaüy, it must be observable that one party is acting according to a certain set of rules, 
before it is even possible for the other party to accept it. 
3
 For example, in wage bargaining p equals the wage proposed. 
2 
the payoff in a conflict situation, according to: 
UA(pj£ = (l-cA)UJpA) + cAUA(conflict) 
In which 
cA = MACR of party A. 
U A(PB) = Utility attached to the proposal of B. 
U A (PA) — Utility attached to the proposal of A. 
XJ
 A(conflict) = Utility attached to the conflict situation.4 
Hence, it is assumed that the utility functions of both parties are known to each party, 
so that each party uses the same values the MACRs. Furthermore, it is assumed that 
the utility to each party is highest for its own proposal, while the utility associated with 
a conflict is the lowest.5 
The idea behind the calculation of MACR and compromising by the party with the 
lowest MACR is that at each moment there are three possible actions for each party. 
From A's viewpoint: 
1) Sticking to A's original demand; 
2) Accepting B's offer; 
3) Adjusting A's original demand. 
Zeuthen makes the crucial assumption that each party compares its own MACR with 
that of the other, and that the one with the lower MACR will compromise. Intuitively, 
the idea is that the party with the higher MACR has "more" to gain by risking a 
conflict, and will therefore "win"the conflict.6 
Zeuthen's model consists therefore of the following set of rules: 
4
 In those cases that bargaining should result in an agreement for a given period, the contract 
period, it is here assumed that the conflict will last for the whole period. 
5
 Throughout tbis paper, we will assume that the conflict payoff is given and does not depend 
on a non-cooperative game or strategical ("optimal threat") criteria. Furthermore, we assume 
everywhere that the fiow of Utilities is constant over time, both for conflict situations as for all 
possible negotiation outcomes. 
6
 Observe, however, that it is not possible to derive tbis mie from optimizing behaviour. 
Especially, the model does not incorporate the possibility of any party willingly entering the 
conflict, risking a conflict with 100% chance. It is therefore not clear what mechanism forces the 
bargaining partner with lower MACR to compromise; he does not need fear the other entering a 
conflict, because in that case the other party would exceed its own MACR as well. The comparisi-
on of botii MACR's therefore only yields a proxy for bargaining strength, given different proposals. 
3 
1) A party will accept a proposal by the other party if it is not possible to make 
another proposal which satisfies both: 
la) The utility associated with its own proposal is higher than the utility level 
associated with the proposal associated with the other party; 
lb) The own MACR associated with one's own proposal is higher than the 
resulting MACR of the other party. 
2) A party will keep to his own proposal whenever his MACR is higher than the 
MACR of his opponent; 
3) Whenever the MACR's are equal, or when its own MACR is lower, a party will 
make a new proposal, for which its own MACR is marginalry higher than that of the 
other party. 
4) If the party with the lower maximum chance of conflict does not give in, the party 
with the higher MACR initiates the conflict.7 
This set of rules is enough to define one unique solution for all 'well-behaved' utility 
functions. Harsanyi [1956] shows that Zeuthen's solution is equal to the point for 
which the product of both utility levels is locally maximized. With more than one local 
maximum, we can choose the global maximum as the relevant one, because it is often 
possible, if necessary, to compensate one party with a side payment by the other party 
in the case that the utility level of one of the parties is lower in the global maximum 
than in one of the other local maximums. Only in the case of two or more local 
maxima with the same value and no other global maximum the bargaining problem 
becomes indeterminate. 
Evaluating the set of rules 1-4, we find that: 
- The set of rules is not too unlikely to be accepted in practice, even though the 
relation between the MACR and bargaining power does not depend on a clear 
mechanism; 
- A conflict will last for the whole period. This can be rational with perfect informati-
ons, but not in real cases where perfect information does not exist. In those cases, it 
is possible that a conflict arises, because of insufficiënt knowledge about the other 
party's situation on either side. A conflict should therefore not be interpreted as a 
violation of the rules per se, and accordingly should not be treated as such. Some kind 
of equilibrating mechanism is therefore necessary, when the model is applied to the 
real world; 
7
 This rule is necessary to 'enforce' the set of rules, but is in disagreement with the assumpti-
ons made above. (See note 4. above) 
8
 Especially in the period in which the set of rules are formed, it is possible to stay put in order 
to enforce the rules to be used in other bargains with the same bargaining partner. 
4 
- In no way can be dealt with time preferences. In general, one would expect a party's 
bargaining position to weaken whenever their discount rate is higher, because the 
present value of income after the end of the conflict is less. A higher discount rate 
means that less can be achieved by initiating a conflict with some durance less than 
the whole contract period. 
Axiomatic approaches: Nash and Kalai and Smorodinskv 
Nash buüds his model on some axioms concerning a two-party game.9 Every two 
person game is characterised by a pair (a,S), with a equal to a point (a „a^, denoting 
the Utilities for player 1 and 2 in case of conflict, while S is the set of possible 
solutions x to the bargaining problem. Each x is a point ( x , ^ of Utilities for player 1 
and 2. The following characteristics of the game are assumed to hold: 
Assumption 1: There is at least one point x e S such that x{ >a{for i= l ,2 . 
Assumption 2: S is convex. 
Assumption 3: S is compact. 
Assumption 4: a{ < x; for every x e S. Points not satisfying this rule can be discarded 
from consideration, yielding a restricted S. 
Furthermore, Nash postulated the following axioms concerning the solutions f:U -> 
R2, with f(a,S) 
Axiom 1: For every (a,S) e U there is no y e S for which y > f(a,S) A y * f(a,S). 
Axiom 2: Define T:R2 -> R2by T((Xi,x2))=(x2,x2). For every (a,S) e U holds 
f(T(a),T(S))=T(f(a,S)). 
Axiom 3: Invariance with respect to Affine Transformations of Utility: A is an affine 
transformation of utility if A=(A!,A2):R2->R2, A((x1,x2))=(A,(x1),A^x2)), and the 
maps Afx) are of the form ex + dj for some positive constant Cjand some constant d;. 
We require that for such a transformation A, f(A(a),A(S))= A(f(a,S)) 
Axiom 4: Axiom of independence of irrelevant altematives: 
If (a,S) and (a,T) are bargaining pairs such that S c T and f(a,T) € S, then 
f(a,T)=f(a,S) 
Nash then continues to proof that only one solution to this set of axioms exists: The 
point in which the product of the Utilities is maximized, given such an A that a=(0,0). 
Alternatively, the solution point is the point in which the product of the Utilities less 
the Utilities in the disagreement point is maximized. 
Again this represents a set of rules which can be agreed upon by both parties, 
representing a "fair" solution. In fact, the set of rules of Zeuthen's and Nash's yields 
the same solution. In this way they corroborate each other, in that two reasonable 
*) What follows is largely based on Nash [1950], [1953], Kalai and Smorodinsky [1975], 
Harsanyi [1956] and Luce and Raiffa [1957]. 
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sets of assumptions are mutually compatible. However, the set of rules of Nash's is 
highly unlikely to be conceived/detected/invented in practice, which is a disadvantage 
in comparison with Zeuthen's. The above-mentioned criticisms of Zeuthen's are valid 
for Nash's, but the argument doesn't need to be repeated here. 
The choice of the set of axioms of Nash's has been criticised, too. The main thrust of 
the attack on Nash's model is against the axiom of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives. Luce and Raiffa [1957] point out that under certain conditions this axiom 
is psychologically questionable. 10 To follow Luce and Raiffa, consider the two games 
A and B in figure 1 and figure 2 respectively. 
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Figure 2 Game B 
Nash's solution is (5,50) for both of these games. Now suppose that in B both players 
have agreed on (5,50), and then continue with the new game A. According to Luce 
and Raiffa it is now possible that player 2 will not satisfy himself with (5,50) as his 
potential in A is greater than in B. If this is the case, then in general two solutions are 
possible: Either the outcome in A is dependent on history, or the solution in B is of 
the general type (>5,<50).This latter approach has been foliowed by Kalai and 
Smorodinsky [1975] who substituted the following axiom for the axiom of indepen-
dence of irrelevant solutions: 
Axiom 4' Axiom of monotonicity: If (a.Sj) and (a,S,) are bargaining pairs such that 
b^S^—b^S^) and g ^ ^ then f^a,S,)^a,S^, with g/X]) the maximum player two 
can get given that player 1 gets x,. In mis b ,(S) is defined as 
sup {x e R: For some y e R (x,y) e S}, and b (^S) as sup {y e R: For some x e R 
(x,y) € S}. 
This set of axioms 1-4' also defines a unique solution. However, this set of 
axioms seems to us psychologically less plausible, because it would mean that player 2 
in B satisfies himself with less in order to get more in A than in B. Comparing both 
10) However, this argument does not appeal to much to them. In contrast, Kalai and Smorodin-
sky (197S) put much more emphasis on this argument. 
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games, this seems logical; however, comparing both set of rules player 2 is the one 
who is better of with Nash's rules, while Kalai and Smorodinsky hold that player 2 is 
the one who would be unsatisfied with Nash's rules. The sets of axioms of Nash and 
Kalai and Smorodinsky are therefore both possible as a set of rules, while both do not 
contain a mechanism by which the rules can be easily invented. We return to this 
point in the following section, in which the desiderata of a set of rules are described. 
H Desirable charactenstics of a set of rules 
In repeated bargaining it pays for both parties to informally agree upon a set of rules. 
A proper set of rules can guarantee that the chances of costly conflicts are mini-
mized.n We now want to investigate the desirable characteristics of such a set of 
rules. We can assume that both parties will like to agree upon a set of rules with some 
measure of fairness, and efficiency, while at the same time in cases of perfect 
information no conflict will arise. 
First, the set of rules should exhibit some sense of fairness, because no party 
will accept a set of rules that is biased against itself. Fairness demands a.o. that if the 
parties' position interchange, the outcome will be the same (with the payoffs inter-
changed too, of course). In Nash's model this is postulated in the axiom of symmetry, 
and in Zeuthen's the equilibrium mechanism is symmetrie. 
Furthermore, we want the solution to be Pareto optimal, so that no one can 
be made better off without harming the other. This assumption is logical, because 
otherwise both parties would have agreed upon a set of rules upon which both can 
improve simultaneously. 
Thirdly, it can be assumed that both parties will make concessions in case of 
conflict, to minimize the damage done by misunderstanding each others' position. At 
the same time, however, we demand that this concession mechanism does not 
encourage breaking the rules purposefully. We elaborate on this in appendix I. 
Fouithly, all relevant information should be incorporated in the set of rules. 
These are a.o. the Utilities of both parties given a certain solution, and their time 
preferences. The time preferences are important, because a higher preference for 
present consumption weakens the bargaining position, because the gains from winning 
a conflict are less. In this paper, we abstract from the financial position of both 
parties, for sake of simplicity. However, it should be noted that in the general case the 
financial position is important too. This can be incorporated in a model by making the 
payoffs time dependent. 
Fifthly, we assume that for both parties long-term considerations are the most 
important. This means that they both will try to enforce the rules of the game, rather 
then seek to minimize the costs in case of conflict. 
Sixthly, we want the set of rules to be plausible, in that it is perceived that the 
other party is trying to enforce these set of rules, and that the measure of the bargain-
11
 Such a set of rules could even be agreed upon for one-time cooperative bargaining. 
Accepting that the set of rules is "fair" for recurrent bargaining, it could even be accepted as fair 
for one time bargaining. 
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ing position is in some way not too far-fetched. This should make it plausible that in 
practical recurrent bargaining this set of rules is finally taken as the normal bargaining 
result. n In the case of Nash's model, this is a big problem, because the set of axioms 
are in no way obvious. 
In the following section we discuss a model which satisfies most of the abonemen-
tioned criteria. 
Hl A Bargaining model using the maximum conflict iength 
In our approach, we try to find a solution which satisfies all the in section II 
mentioned criterias. We'11 argue that the maximum Iength of a conflict both parties 
can endure, in order to try profitably to get their own proposal accepted, is the 
relevant one for establishing a proxy for bargaining power. The party with the lower 
maximum conflict Iength will concede. The rationale behind this approach that a party 
will not likely engage in a conflict if he knows that bis opponent can stick to nis 
demands longer men he himself can. This approach leads us to a set of rules which 
can be easily arrived at in practical bargaining. 
To see this more clearly, let's assume that both parties during conflicts evaluate 
whether they would have preferred to accept the offer of the other party directly, or 
that they - if they would get their demands fulfilled at this very moment - prefer the 
conflict situation, and similarly evaluate the other party's situation. In such a way, they 
can find out that if the other has a longer maximum conflict Iength he'11 hang around 
longer to get nis demands fulfilled and v.v.Therefore, we have a plausible mechanism 
with which it is plausible to arrive at this a set of rules. Furthermore, this approach 
has the obvious advantage that time preferences affect the bargaining outcome.13 
In this section we set about to describe the set of rules according to which the 
equilibrium solution is obtained. 
12
 It is interesting to include Raiffa's critique on game theoiy heie. Based on nis own 
experiences at the founding negotiations of IIASA, he found that game theoiy assumes to much 
rationality for the parties involved, enabling them to calculate move and countermove, ad infinitum. 
In practice, information is constrained, and rationa! behaviour might not always be expected. 
(Raiffa [1982]) 
13
 The approach we follow in mis and the following sections is in the same spirit as Keizer's 
model of bilateral wage bargaining (Keizer [1986]). Keizer takes the maximum conflict Iength is as 
the determinant of bargaining power; however we feel that Keizer makes a crucial misspecification 
in assuming that the relevant wage proposals are the one of the union, and the wage proposal of 
the firm, monopsonist of labour, in the case of absence of trade unions. Because the union is able 
to adjust its wage demands, while the firm is not, the bargaining position is asymmetrically defined 
in favour of the trade union. In our model, we leave bom parties free to adjust their proposals. 
8 
The Model 
Having established the concessionary behaviour of both parties in cases of incomplete 
information, we concentrate here exclusively on bargaining under complete informa-
tion. The concessionary behaviour described in Appendix I can be tagged onto this 
model later to describe real conflict situations. 
Furthermore, like the models above, we assume that both parties try to maxi-
mize their respective Utilities functions. Each of these utility functions are known to 
both parties. 
The set of rales is as follows: 
1 In case of a disagreement there are two proposals pA and pB. A calculates its 
maximum allowable conflict length (MACL) tA as the length of the conflict, with 
which he is as well off by accepting directry pB as by initiating the conflict, obtaining 
U(conflict) and after the conflict nas ended obtaining pA. In the same way B calculates 
its MACL tB as the length of the conflict, with which they are equally well off by 
accepting pA directry as by initiating a conflict of length tB, and after mat obtaining 
PB-
2 Both parties try to maximize the utility level implied by their proposal, under 
constraint that their MACL is higher then the MACL of their opponents. 
This can be alternatively formulated as that both will adjust their proposals in 
cases when the MACL's are equal, while in case that the MACL's unequal the one 
with the lower MACL adjusts its proposal just enough to get the higher MACL. 
These two rales are enough to define one unique solution. For the equilibrium, it is 
obvious that the following equations should hold: 
tA - h = 0 (2) 
PA = PB = P eq 
(3) 
dUA(p ) If AKye«>0 (4a) 
*PA 
dUA(p ) If A*«<0 (4b) 
dpA dpA dpA 
dtA 
dPA 
<. 
dtB 
dPA 
dtA 
^ 
d^_ 
9 
dt„ dtA 
dpB dpB 
If BXy'q'>0 
dtB dt. 
B ^ A If B^^<Q 
(5a) 
(5b) 
Equations (4a,b) and (5a,b) guarantee that in equilibrium no party can make a 
proposal which leaves him better of, if accepted, while his maximum conflict length 
will be longer than that of his opponent. 
We have the following equations for tA and tB: 
fujpg) e'Mt dt = fuA(pA)e'M' dt +fuA(conftict) e^At dt (<>) 
ƒUB(pA) e-eBt dt = füjjtpje'**' dt + ƒU^conflict) e'eBt dt (?) 
Solving (2) to (7) we get the following solution for equilibrium: 
T
r
 Q. dUXp ) 
fe-^'dt ( A^)(UB(pJ - UB{conflict)) + 
o dp * n 
T 
)e-*Btdt (dUB^)(UA(pJ-UA(conflict)) = 0 
o dP 
14 
(8) 
This solution differs fundamentally from the solution obtained by Nash and Zeuthen, 
in that the time preferences enter in (8). In those cases where both time preferences 
14
 It is possible that (8) has more than one solution. In those cases in which (8) nas more than 
one solution, we assume the equilibrium to be the one for which the joint product of both Utilities 
is the highest. This additional requirement can be justified with the argument that if equilibrium 
Pe,, favors one and the other equilibrium p ^ favors two, one will have the longer MAC1 if the 
product of both Utilities associated with p,,, (with conflict Utilities nonnalized to 0) is higher than 
those associated withp^. 
10 
are equal, however, the solution is equal to the ones obtained by Zeuthen and Nash. 
(See section V). In the next section, we first investigate the stabüity of the proposed 
equilibrium: will the proposed set of rules always lead to a sequence of bids, converg-
ing to equilibrium? 
Section IV Stabüity of the eqwilihrmm 
In this section we consider the stabüity of the equüibrium, e.g. will the set of result in 
a sequence of bids which will converge to equüibrium? Our research strategy is to 
proof that the party with the lower MACL wül be able to increase bis MACL relative 
to his opponent only by compromising in the direction of equüibrium. 
I wül concentrate on utility curves with decreasing marginal utility, and for 
concreteness (but without loss of generality) we assume that UA is increasing in p, 
whüe UB is decreasing. Furthermore, I wül concentrate on those cases in which each 
player wül demand more man his conflict payoff. 
So we have 
U'A<P)>Q ; Ufo)<0 (9) 
Ué(p)<0 ; U'j(p)>0 (10) 
Starting from equations (6) and (7), we derive 
dtA dtB 
dpA dpA 
1 {UA(PB)-UA(conflictMUA(pA)-UA(p^e-^ _ j ^ 
tflpyh. UA(pA)-UA(conflict) QA + 
A A
 UA(pA)+UA(confiicf)HUA(pA)-UA(p^)e-6At 
U'B(pA)]e-»*dt 
UB(PA) ~ U^conflict) +(UB(pJ - ^(PA)^ -9BT 
11 
dtB dtA 
dpB dp B "TB 
(/«(PD) + (12) 
T 
ui(pB)fe-^dt 
UM-U^conflictMUtipJ-U^e -BAT 
Observe that (11) is monotonically decreasing in pA, while (12) is monotonically 
increasing in pB. Furthermore, tA - tB is continuous in pA and pB, as are (11) and (12). 
For each pB (except for pB = peq) there are two solutions to tA - tB = 0: The trivial 
one is pA = pB, for which tA =• tB = 0, and one for which either tA = tB > 0 (Each 
side demanding more than in equilibrium) or tA = tB < 0 (Each side demanding less 
than in equilibrium). 
Finally, note that the line for which (11) = 0 lies in between the two lines for which 
tA = tB. The same holds for (12) = 0. 
ït is easy to show that for pA = pB < p„q (11) is positive and (12) is negative, while if 
PA = PB > Peq (11) is negative, while (12) is positive. From these observations follows 
that if tA < tB and pA > p ^ A can only lengthen his MACL relative to B's by lowering 
pA (decreasing bis demand, moving in direction of equilibrium), while if tA < tg, with 
PA < Peq» A can only lengthen his MACl relative to B's by increasing pA (increasing his 
demand, moving to equilibrium). Similarly, if tB < tA and pB < p^, B should increase 
pB, while if tB < tA and pB > Peq B should decrease ps, in botii cases moving to 
equilibrium. So we conclude that if player i bas the lower t;, he should make another 
proposal ti5 closer to equilibrium. 
Q.E.D. 
For convenience, I pictured the various relations in one graph.15 See figure 3. The 
exact shape of the curves depends on the utility curves and time preferences, but the 
genera! form of the graph will be like this. 
15
 The graph is based on a calculations with UA = pvt,pB = (12-p) *, T = 10, GA = 0.05,and 6B 
= 0.1.The picture is normalised so that p,,, = 0. 
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Section V Some explorations into the model 
Comparison with the Nash solution. 
Nash's solution is the point in which the product of both utility differences with the 
conflict utility levels is maximized. This is equivalent to: 
max {(U^-U^conflict)) {U^^-U^confUct)) (ƒ«""•' dt) (fe~6B' dt)} (13) 
After taking derivatives, and rearranging, this yields 
dVApJ dUJpJ dUApJ 
—^-UB(pJ * UJpJ—^aL - -^LuJconflict) -dp B*eq' A^' dp dp - - - '
 ( 1 4 ) 
UJconflict) = 0 dVB(peq) 
dp 
This confirms that Nash's solution is independent of time preferences. Comparing (8) to 
(14), we see that if 9U = 8f the discount factors can be factored out to yield (10), so that 
mis model is equal to Nash's if the time preferences are equivalent. In cases where both 
time preferences are unequal, the solution of Nash's and our model will not be the same.16 
Uneertaintv about the after-conflict sitüation 
After conflict, both parties expect their proposal to get accepted with chance X{, 
while they expect that the proposal of the other party gets accepted with a chance of 1-Xj. 
In this case, (2) to (7) becomes 
tA = tB = 0 (15) 
PA = PB <16> 
_ ± s _ * if A^«!>o (17a) 
dpA dpA dpA 
15
 It is easy to proof that if time preferences are unequal, the solution to the model differs 
from that of the Nash solution, even if different conflict strategies with respect to concessions over 
time are considered. 
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dUXp ) 
If AWeq<0 (17b) 
dPA 
If dU^^>0 (18a) 
dpB 
If dÜB(p^<Q (18b) 
dPB dpB dpB 
"*A 
dPA 
z "*B 
dPA 
dpB 
<, 
dtA 
dpB 
dtB 
k 
dtA 
fujpj e-6Atdt = XA fujpje-»* * dt +(l-XA) fujp^e^ * dt 
0
 *A *A 
*A 
fuA(coTtfüct) e~6At dt 
o 
T T T 
fuB(pA) e-°Btdt = XB / ^ ( p ^ T 6 * ' dt + ( 1 - ^ fuB(pA)e-°Btdt 
0
 H h 
*B 
fUB(conflict) e-QBt dt 
o 
solving (15) to (20) yields 
dUA(p J r f 0 i XA j U ~*A ^ (UB{conflict) ~ UB(p)) = dp JQ 
T 
^ ^
q
 fe-9B,dt(UA(pJ - UA(conflict)) 
dp J0 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
As long as XA = Xg and X. & 0 i.e. each party expects that there is some chance that there 
proposal will be accepted after the conflict X can be factored out to yield (8). So given 
equal A'S for each party and X * 0 the solution of the bargaining problem is invariant 
towards X. 
This conclusion can be used to defend the model against the criticism above that there 
exists disagreement about the after conflict situation. This disagreement, while at the same 
time maintaining that the own proposals will be accepted after conflict, means that each 
party has to assume that either they are themselves irrational, or their adversaries are 
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irrational concerning this point. Accepting the first is implausible, while accepting the 
second means that the adversaries are irrational doing the same as they themselves do. The 
problem is circumvented, however, when each party calculates their maximum conflict 
length given X = 0.5, in which the situation is symmetrical, and both expect that the after 
conflict situation each proposal has equal chance to be accepted. 
VI Discussion and conclusion 
Summarizing, a new model was developed which is based on the maximum allowable 
conflict length. If the conflict length ex ante is known to be longer than the maximum 
allowable conflict length, it is not possible for one to profit trom initating the conflict, even 
if one gets one's proposal in the end. In the model, equilibrium is reached by manipulating 
one's proposals so that one's maximum allowable conflict length is longer than that of the 
other party. It was proofed that the equibrium mechanism consists of a series of bids, which 
will converge to equilibrium. This equilibrium is only equal to the Nash solution if time 
preferences are equal; otherwise it will differ. 
The main advantages of this approach is that the model is able to treat differences 
in time preferences. A higher time preference will reduce one's bargaining power, due to 
impatience. The crucial role of time in the model is another crucial plus, as creating a 
deadlock is one often used bargaining strategy. 
Though the equilibrium mechanism looks quite plausible,it suffers somewhat from the same 
weakness as the Zeuthen model, in that there is no strong rational mechanism between 
giving in and a lower maximum allowable conflict length (compare fn. 6). In this model, the 
difficulty is that the maximum allowable conflict length is calculated assuming that one gets 
its own proposal accepted after the conflict, while there is no reason why this should be the 
case. Some defence against this criticism is possible, however: 
- The first and more intuitive defense is that someone would not like to enter a conflict, 
which bis opponent could prolong longer (ex ante), without being sure that accepting the 
others proposal from the start would have been better. 
- The second defense is based on a sensible arbitration mechanism and a result of section 
V above. A sensible arbitration mechanism is to toss a coin after some time has passed, in 
which both parties received their conflict payoff, in order to select one of the two proposals. 
It is assumed that this outcome is made binding. 
If a conflict threatens to occur, both parties can declare what their maximum conflict length 
is, given that the coin will be tossed. However, observe that they have to agree on when to 
toss the coin in order to be able to write a binding contract. If the maximum conflict length 
are unequal, they can be made equal, either by having the one with the lower giving in a 
little bit, or by the other demanding more. If the maximum conflict lengths are equal, but 
the proposals unequal, a move to equilibrium by one of the players will be the sensible 
strategy. From section V we know that the outcome of this bargaining problem is equal to 
the outcome of the model above. 
A lot of further research is needed. Obvious points for further research are treatment of 
16 
the model with time dependent Utilities, and an extension of the model to the n-person 
case. The biggest difficulty in our model is the way the maximum conflict length is calcu-
lated. Both parties think they can put through their own demands after terminating the 
conflict, disagreement exists about the situation after terminating the conflict. These 
expectations are not in accordance with the equilibrium arrived at by the concessionary 
behaviour described in section Dl. To these problems we will return in a later paper. 
17 
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Appendix I General model for concessions in cases with incomplete information 
In this appendix we investigate the problem of the concessionary behaviour in case 
of a conflict. The concession curves obtained are general, and can be applied to botii the 
Nash and the Kalai and Smorodinsky solutions to the bargaining problem. 
Let's digress for a moment from our main line of reasoning to consider the consequences of 
incomplete information. Johansen [1979] criticizes the cooperative game approach, because 
this class of models predicts that agreement always will be reached. Clearly, that is not the 
case. One of the reasons why conflicts do happen is incomplete information, causing 
incompatible claims by both parties, even though they apply the same set of rules. 
In a conflict, the strategical models call for a conflict length equal to the contract 
length.' In the context of complete information, this makes sense. Under complete 
information conflicts can only arise when one or both violate the rules purposefully; and 
non-concessionary behaviour would be the only way to enforce the rules agreed upon. 
However, this is not the case when information is incomplete. In that case, it is possible 
that the rules of the game are not purposefully violated, while at the same time a conflict 
arises, because of mistakes in estimating of the other parties position - for instance because 
of a misspecification of the costs and benefits. 
It is in the interest of both parties to reach a compromise. The concession strategy 
has to satisfy a few criteria: 
Because both parties do not know whether their perception of the other 
parties' position is right, both sides have to make concessions; 
The way concessions are made have to satisfy the condition that purposeral 
violation of the rules does not pay-off; the rules agreed upon must to be 
enforced. 
The concession strategy must be so chosen that the cost of conflict is 
minimal, given the constraint of the two above-mentioned criteria. 
The strategy which satisfies these three criteria is one in which each party makes conces-
sions in such a way, that the other party would do equally well by directly giving in, instead 
of prolonging the conflict. So A's concession curve is defined by the condition that B would 
be equally well off accepting A's original offer (Using A's estimation about the relevant 
information) as by prolonging the conflict in order to get B's proposal accepted. 
Mathematically, this strategy is easy to develop. As before, is is assumed that each 
proposal can be characterized by p. I further require that p is continuous and U is a 
continuous, differentiable function of p. In general p is multi-dimensional; here I only treat 
the one-dimensional case. First, we calculate the concession curve for A: 
1
 Here we assume that the contract length is defined by specifying a date in future at which the 
contract expires. In case of a shorter conflict, ended by reaching an agreement, the agreement hold 
for a period equal to the maximum contract length minus the conflict time. 
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ƒ u;(p£ e-*B'< dt = ƒ Ufconftict) e'**'' dt + ƒ Ufoj e**'' dt (A.1) 
In which: 
UB* = Utility function of B, as perceived by A. 
p * = Equilibrium proposal according to A; this is equal to A's original offer. 
e-ê6*t _ Discounting factor of B, as perceived by A. 
T = The maximum contract length. 
p A t = A's proposal at moment t. 
After some rewriting, this is equivalent to: 
-±U;(p;q)e-°*'T + ±u;<pï - -^(conflict) e**'* 
QB QB ÖB 
±U;(conflict) ~ -Ufaj e-°B'T
 + \u*B(pM) e ^ 
ö« 9B QB 
(A.2) 
Defïning 
dB = {~u;(p;q)+±u;(conlict)}e-*B*T + -\{U;(p^-U;(confiict)} (A.3) 
QB QB QB 
we get after some rearranging 
UB(PA) = * <A.4) 
M
 e-9B*t_e-9B'T 
This means that A's concession curve is given by 
Pjt-u;^ i — ) (A.5) 
e-ezrt_g-eB*r 
Similarly, B's concession curve is given by 
Pm ' UA *"< ~ — T > <A-«> 
"
 e-6A't_e-M'T 
With dAdefmed by 
20 
dA = {—Uto^-l-Ufconime-M'T * —JU*(p^-U*(conflict)} (A.7) 
QA 9 A QA 
This general concessionary behaviour is can be tagged on to each strategical model of 
bargaining. 
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